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What is the reductionist position as regards the 




By Damian E M Milton 
 
Much of what is generally called knowledge is socially generated from testimonial beliefs.  
Social co-operation is essential in transmitting knowledge across space (e.g. the Internet) 
and time (past conceptual ideas being used in the present), however, testimony can also be 
used to deliberĂƚĞůǇ ŵŝƐůĞĂĚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐ Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? Ă  ?ĨĂůƐĞ
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƵƐďĞŝŶŐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?dŚŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĚĞĐĞŝƚůĞĂĚƐto checks and balances 
being applied to reduce subsequent incorrect views or to reject the justification of 
testimonial belief without the belief being grounded in non-testimonial evidence.  The latter 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ?ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĂǀŝĚ,ƵŵĞ  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ
Pritchard 2006).  Through the course of this essay, the efficacy of the reductionist view of 
testimonial belief will be analysed, in contrast to a credulist approach that argues that one 
can accept testimonial belief, if there are no specific reasons to doubt them. 
Hume (cited in Pritchard 2006) attempted to trace the non-testimonial grounds for 
accepting testimonial beliefs and concluded that where testimony lacked such independent 
supporting grounds, than a belief was impossible to verify and thus justify the use of.  The 
strength of this approach is to show that testimonial belief, if grounded in independent 
empirical evidence, can be tested and subsequently validated (or indeed falsified).  Hume 
(cited in Pritchard 2006) suggests that in order to have a justified belief, an individual must 
have acquired personal evidence of the reliability of those producing the belief.  This point 
however could prove difficult for research into human interactions in the Social Sciences, as 
much of the original supporting evidence is destroyed to protect the anonymity and ethical 
concerns of the participants. 
A criticism of the reductionist approach is that collaboration in academia is essential for 
furthering knowledge and a researcher simply cannot personally test every single variable 
that may be of interest to their studies.  Relying solely on personal experience, would be like 
ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇ ďĞŝŶŐ  ?ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ? ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ĚĞŶǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƵŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂďůĞ
knowledge gained through social interaction.  As social beings, humans inevitably rely on 
testimony for pragmatic purposes.  This is the view taken up by credulists to describe the 
importance of using the testimony of others to inform beliefs.  For instance, Thomas Reid 
(cited in Pritchard 2006) argued that testimonial beliefs can be justified externally and can 
be counted as knowledge, despite not having independent grounds to accept them.   
Academia can be seen to be based on a form of credulism.  A student writing an essay is 
expected to show support for arguments by referencing peer reviewed literature.  Without 
this 'evidence' arguments are seen as 'personal opinion' and often judged as having little 
worth and without academic conferences and the sharing of research findings, or if scientists 
had to test every last detail of scientific enquiry personally, than little academic progress 
would be made.   
In contrast to this academic collaboration is when something holds enough intrinsic value as 
a topic to an individual researcher, or there seems to be a gap in current thinking.  This 
context will inspire researchers to analyse more deeply and add to the 'body of knowledge' 
that others can then draw upon (without them necessarily having to analyse all aspects of a 
topic).  If something is 'important' enŽƵŐŚƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? they will investigate it 
further (yet usually within the confines of credible methods tested by the academic 
community).  Without credulism, academia would break down.  One problem with this 
approach however, is there is much debate as to what counts as academically viable 
(credible) knowledge.  It can be said that there are no grounds to believe the testimony of 
another, without checking this testimony against that of others (e.g. experts often 
disagree).  There are usually inconsistencies on any topic and ones without much 
disagreement often are hiding a political agenda and/or are not sufficiently self-critical. 
Testimony is practical and for simple factual information can easily be tested externally: if an 
agent asked for the directions from ten people whilst lost, they would have good reason to 
take an amalgamated interpretation and get to their destination (if there was consistency 
between them).  Testimony however, is to be judged with scepticism on more complicated 
matters, for example if one were to ask ten expert theorists of child development there may 
be similarities expressed in their accounts, yet also inconsistencies and sometimes 
oppositional accounts given. 
When analysing the use of reductionism, some issues arise: In the sense that personal 
observations are adapted into language or 'personal testimony', then what can be defined as 
Ă ?ŶŽŶ-ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂů ?ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?One could argue that much of what we call 'knowledge' is not 
value-free and is ideological and related to social power, which begs the question: whose 
testimony should one believe?  It seems that reductionists end up justifying their beliefs 
with their own testimony based on how they see/interpret the 'facts' (or the 
testimony/discourse available to them).  Without testing these ideas against those of others, 
they do not hold any public credibility.  So in order to test one's own credibility, one would 
need the testimonial evidence of others.  To test the credibility of others, one needs many 
testimonies agreeing with no obvious flaws (no specific reason to doubt) and/or personally 
acquired evidence.  A reductionist would hold that evidence must be produced from non-
testimonial grounds, yet it is debatable how much this evidence can be divorced from the 
agent who produces it and their perceptions. 
If a testimony has little grounds to support it, then an agent does not have to uncritically 
accept this belief.  Judgements as to the validity of a belief can be suspended until more 
corroborating testimonies are found or personal experience can be employed.  Although 
reductionism can be said to be defendable on purely logical grounds, it would be impractical 
in application.  By taking a more credulist approach to testimony allows for agents to 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?given the information at hand. 
In conclusion, it is unnecessary to take an extreme reductionist or credulist approach 
(leading to stagnation and gullibility respectively), thus aspects of both are needed in order 
to further knowledge, for example a reductionist approach may be useful in challenging the 
received wisdom of a potentially incorrect and yet widely held belief, yet for this new 
information to be passed to others, one would have to rely on credible testimony, that the 
recipient would not be able to test personally. 
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